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INSURANCE - PROOF OF MYSTERIOUS DISAPPEARANCE UNDER
THEFT POLICIES
Policies protecting against the loss of movable property have
followed a trend toward expanding insurance coverage.' Before
1943, there could be no recovery under theft policies unless the
insured produced satisfactory evidence that the insured property
was feloniously taken. 2 Although the felonious taking could be
established by circumstantial evidence,8 the insured who was
unable to prove theft could not recover even though theft was a
reasonable explanation of the property's disappearance. 4  To
alleviate this burden on the insured, the mysterious disappear-
ance clause was introduced in 1943; it provided that any mys-
terious disappearance of property was presumed to be due to
theft.-
The mysterious disappearance clause was not designed to
1. Compare the Residence and Outside Theft Policy with its replacement, the
Broad Form Personal Theft Policy. See the Homeowners Policy -Comprehensive
Form, Form MIC-5 (ed. 12-59) (Louisiana). See generally MEHR & CAMMACK,
PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE (3d ed. 1961).
2. See 1 RicirARDS, INSURANCE § 28 (1952).
3. See National Surety Co. v. Fox, 174 Ark. 827, 296 S.W. 718 (1927)
Sowden v. United States Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 122 Kan. 375, 252 Pac. 208
(1927) ; Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Walthen, 205 Ky. 511, 277 S.W. 4 (1924) ; Cald-
well v. St. Paul Mercury & Indem. Co., 210 Miss. 320, 49 So. 2d 570 (1950) ;
Wolf v. Aetna Ace. & Liab. Co., 183 App. Div. 409, 170 N.Y.S. 787 (1918),
aff'd, 228 N.Y. 724, 126 N.E. 925 (1920) ; Fienglas v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co.,
151 N.Y.S. 371 (1915) Miller v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 247 Pa.
182, 93 Atl. 320 (1915) McDuff v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 47
R.I. 172, 131 AtI. 550 (1925); 8 CoucH, INSURANCE § 2241 (1931) ; 1 Ricii-
ARDS, INSURANCE § 28 (1952).
4. See, e.g., National Surety Co. v. Redmon, 173 Ky. 294, 190 S.W. 1081
(1917) (diamond stud placed on dresser; evidence of marks on window screen
and footprints on roof discovered three weeks after loss insufficient to establish
theft) ; Rosen v. Royal Indem. Co., 259 Mass. 194, 156 N.E. 52 (1927) (ring
placed in bag in closet; house left open with servant present; in holding for the
insurer, the court stated that it was necessary to show that the ring was stolen
by some person for whose larceny the insurer would be liable under the policy) ;
Bachman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 194 N.Y.S. 89 (1922), aff'd, 204 App.
Div. 871, 197 N.Y.S. 897 (1922) (diamond brooch left in drawer; front door left
open with servant present; proof of theft insufficient in view of insured's orig-
inal position that it was lost during trip home) ; Marks v. New Jersey Fid. &
Plate Glass Ins. Co., 168 N.Y.S. 627 (1918) (negligence of insured in moving
goods or innocent act of maid in losing key to home inconsistent with loss by
theft) ; Gordon v. Aetna Indem. Co., 116 N.Y.S. 558 (1909) (proof of disap-
pearance of diamond locket from insured's home, presence of two servants, and
futile search by detectives insufficient to establish theft). See 8 CoucH, INSUR-
ANCE § 2241 (1931).
5. As it appeared in the Residence and Outside Theft policy, it read: "The
word theft includes larceny, burglary, and robbery. Mysterious disappearance of
any insured property shall be presumed to be due to theft." In 1948 the clause
was revised to read: "The word theft includes larceny, burglary, and robbery.
Mysterious disappearance, except a precious or semiprecious stone from its set-
ting in any watch or piece of jewelry, shall be presumed to be due to theft."
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provide coverage for perils other than theft; rather, it was de-
signed to clarify the kind and amount of proof necessary to per-
mit recovery under the policy.6 In the first case to consider a
claim under the mysterious disappearance clause,7 the court de-
fined mysterious disappearance as "any disappearance of loss
under unknown, puzzling, or baffling circumstances, which are
difficult to understand."" In conformity with the purpose of
the clause, 9 the court determined that once the insured proved
the mysterious disappearance, the presumption of theft arose;
and it fell upon the insurer to negative the presumption. 10 In
subsequent cases the burden of rebutting the presumption of
theft varied with the probability of theft under the circum-
stances of the disappearance. If the insured failed to show more
than a remote possibility of theft, the presumption of theft was
readily rebuttable by other circumstantial evidence" or even by
cross-examination of the plaintiff without affirmative evi-
dence. 12 A Louisiana court held that "where there is no fact
which can be pointed to as evidencing the remotest possibility
of theft, we find it impossible to classify the disappearance as
6. See Davis v. St. Paul Mercury & Indem. Co., 227 N.C. 80, 40 S.E.2d 609
(1946). See also Loop v. United States Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 63 So. 2d 247
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1953); Casey v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co. of Amer-
ica, 3 Misc.2d 918, 160 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1956) ; Sigel, v. American Guar. & Liab.
Ins. Co., 173 Pa. Super. 434, 98 A.2d 376 (1953) ; Field, "Mysterious Disappear-
ance" Under the New Theft Policy, 1945 INs. L.J. 3; Kelly, "Mysterious Di8ap-
pearance" Defined, 28 INs. COUNSEL J. 72 (1961) ; Opgenorth, Mysterious Dis-
appearance and Presumption of Theft Clause, 1952 INs. L.J. 97.
7. Davis v. St. Paul Mercury & Indem. Co., 227 N.C. 80, 40 S.E.2d 609, 169
A.L.R. 224 (1946). The insured claimed for $97 in currency which he had in
his pocket and which disappeared when he fell into the water while on a fishing
trip with a friend. The trial court declined to submit the issue of theft to thejury which found in a special verdict that there was a mysterious disappearance;
judgment was rendered for the insured. On appeal, the court reversed, ordering
a new trial for determination whether the disappearance occurred by theft within
the meaning of the policy.
8. Id. at 83, 40 S.E.2d at 611.
9. See note 6 supra.
10. Davis v. St. Paul Mercury & Indem. Co., 227 N.C. 80, 40 S.E.2d 609
(1946) ; accord, Loop v. United States Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 63 So. 2d 247
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1953) ; Caldwell v. St. Paul Mercury & Indem. Co., 210 Miss.
320, 49 So. 2d 570 (1950) ; Casey v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co. of Amer-
ica, 204 Misc. 1106, 124 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1953), afI'd, 3 Misc.2d 918, 160 N.Y.S.2d
114 (1956), aff'd, 5 A.D.2d 724, 168 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1957); Levine v. Accident
& Cas. Ins. Co., 203 Misc. 135, 112 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1952); Gordon v. Eureka
Cas. Co., 187 Pa. Super. 636, 146 A.2d 379 (1958) ; Sigel v. American Guar. &
Liab. Ins. Co., 173 Pa. Super. 434, 98 A.2d 376 (1953) ; Ruby v. Farmers Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 274 Wis. 158, 79 N.W.2d 644 (1956).
11. See Casey v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co. of America, 3 Misc.2d 918,
160 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1956), aff'd, 5 A.D.2d 724, 168 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1957) ; Sigel
v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 173 Pa. Super. 434, 98 A. 2d 376 (1953).
12. See Ruby v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 Wis. 158, 79 N.W.2d 644
(1956).
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mysterious and to accept the presumption that there was a
theft." 3
Complexity in the litigation of the dual issues of mysterious
disappearance and the presumption of theft was partially re-
sponsible for the 1956 revision 14 which did away with the pre-
sumption of theft language and made mysterious disappearance
a separate insured peril. 15 A Louisiana case was the first to con-
sider a claim under the new coverage. 16 The plaintiff last re-
membered seeing his ring on a dresser at his daughter's home in
Baton Rouge on the day before he flew to Shreveport. The fol-
lowing day he missed his ring, whereupon he searched his home,
inquired at a cleaning establishment where he had left the suit
which he had worn the previous day,'7 checked the airline office,
and telephoned his daughter, all to no avail. On original hearing
the insurer was successful: the court stated that the coverage
remained theft and relied on an earlier case which had held that
where there was no fact pointing to theft, the disappearance
13. Loop v. United States Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 63 So. 2d 247 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1953).
14. Another factor responsible for the revision was the introduction of the
Broad Form Personal Theft Policy which was designed to provide a more liberal
policy to meet the needs of a rapidly growing, insurance-minded public by broad-
ening certain areas of protection. See Kelly, "Mysterious Disappearance" De-
fined, 28 INs. COUNSEL J. 72 (1961).
The mysterious disappearance clause of the Broad Form Personal Theft Pol-
icy reads: "This company agrees to pay for loss by theft or attempt thereat or
mysterious disappearance away from the premises of personal property which is
owned or used by an insured .... ." To the same effect are the Homeowners
Policy-Form B, Louisiana Form MPB 323 (ed. 7-56) and the Extended Theft
Coverage endorsement, Form 11O-103 (ed. 9-58), to Homeowners Policy-Broad
Form, Forms MIC-2 (ed. 12-59) (Louisiana) and MIC-4 (ed. 12-59) (Louisi-
ana).
15. See RIEoAL & MILLER, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 754 (4th
ed. 1959); RODDA, FIRE AND PROPERTY INSURANCE 421-22 (1956); NATIONAL
UNDERWRITER CO., FIDELITY, CASUALTY AND SURETY BULLETINS, Pb-3 (re-num-
bered March 1956) ; Kelly, "Mysterious Disappearance" Defined, 28 INS. COUN-
SEL J. 72, 82 (1961).
It may be noted that the 1956 revision also added coverage for attempted
theft. That this is a separate insured peril is easily seen for the peril insured
against is necessarily damage to or destruction of the property rather than its
absolute loss. See Midlo v. Indiana Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 160 So. 2d 314
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
16. Englehart v. Assurance Co. of America, 139 So. 2d 108 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1962).
17. When plaintiff submitted his Proof of Loss to defendant he stated to
defendant's adjuster that he left his ring in the watch pocket of his suit when
left at the cleaners. This statement formed the basis of defendant's denial of
coverage under a special exclusion which provided: "This insurance does not
apply: . .. (C) to property while in the charge of any laundry, cleaner, dyer,
tailor or presser except by robbery or by theft through breaking and entering at
their premises." 139 So. 2d at 113. At trial, plaintiff produced testimony that
the ring was not in the suit when left at the cleaners and the court found that
the insurer had failed to bear the burden of proving that the loss came within
the exclusion.
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could not be classified as mysterious within the coverage of the
policy.18 On rehearing the court recognized the difference be-
tween the language of the clause at issue in the earlier case and
that in the instant case, and held for the plaintiff. Thus, the in-
creased coverage provided by the deletion of the presumption of
theft language was made effective:
"[Plaintiff's] ring disappeared under unknown, puzzling,
and baffling circumstances which arouse wonder, curiosity,
or speculation, or circumstances which are difficult to under-
stand or explain. Having proved such, we think he is en-
titled to recover under the provisions of this policy without
the necessity of further showing the loss was either 'possibly
or probably' a theft."19 (Emphasis added.)
Two subsequent cases decided almost simultaneously and on
strikingly similar facts reached opposite conclusions under the
new clause. 20 To resolve the uncertainty likely to be generated
by these two cases, the coverage of mysterious disappearance
as an insured peril should be clearly delineated. 21 It should be
observed that the coverage is not as extensive as that of the "all
risk" policies.2 2 Mere loss, such as dropping property over the
side of a boat,23 having the diamond plucked from a ring while
18. Loop v. United States Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 63 So. 2d 247 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1953).
19. 139 So. 2d at 113.
20. Seward v. Assurance Co. of America, 32 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1963); Austin
v. American Cas. Co., 193 A.2d 741 (D.C. Mun. App. 1963). Although the
Austin case was decided two months later, it does not appear that the court was
aware of the decision in Seward. The insured in Seward put her diamond-studded
wrist watch on and went on a shopping tour. After going to several stores and
making several purchases, she discovered her watch was missing. Similarly, the
insured in Austin was aware of the bracelet on her wrist when she entered a
clothing store. She tried on several coats, left the store, and went to her home.
The next day she discovered her bracelet was missing. Mrs. Seward recovered,
but Mrs. Austin did not.
21. The suggestion has been made by Kelly, "Mysterious Disappearance" De-
fined, 28 INs. COUNSEL J. 72, 77 (1961), that two conditions should be met: (1)
the disappearance must be from a clearly identified location, and (2) the cir-
cumstances should suggest theft as the logical explanation. While helpful under
earlier policies in which mysterious disappearance is properly used to raise a
presumption of theft, this test seems too tightly drawn under the 1956 clause
in which mysterious disappearance is covered as a separate insured peril. If theft
can be shown, the insured can recover under that particular coverage and re-
liance on the mysterious disappearance clause is unnecessary. See cases cited in
note 3 supra.
22. With reference to insurance coverage, the term "all risk" is often used
interchangeably with the term "comprehensive." An "all risk" policy, strictly
speaking, would be one that covers a particular piece of personal property against
loss resulting from any and all perils. See MEHR & CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF
INSURANCE 137 (3d ed. 1961). An example of an "all risk" jewelry policy is
the Personal Jewelry and Fur Floater.
23. See NATIONAL UNDERWRITER Co., FIRE, CASUALTY AND SURETY BuLLE-
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feeding a horse, 24 or dropping a ring into a garbage disposal25
is not within the ambit of mysterious disappearance. The best
criterion for a mysterious disappearance is whether the loss or
disappearance of property was under circumstances which are
"inexplicable, enigmatical, puzzling and the like," coupled with
the idea that "there is nothing mysterious about the disappear-
ance of property which is lost or mislaid. '26 Such definition
correctly focuses attention on the mysteriousness of the disap-
pearance. Thus, without regard to when or where the disap-
pearance occurred, 27 the disappearances covered are those from
whose surrounding circumstances no satisfactory explanation
can be found2 1 -those which are inexplicable, unaccountable,
or enigmatic. A 1964 Louisiana case 9 seems to go one step fur-
ther by saying that the mysterious disappearance clause "elimi-
nate [s] the necessity of speculating upon and weighing the
probabilities of various conceivable explanations of such a dis-
appearance." 0 This further step may have the effect of negat-
ing the necessity of the insured's proving that the disappearance
is in fact mysterious. The better view would seem to require
the insured to prove affirmatively that his loss comes within
the coverage of the policy, and when he has shown the enigma,
to require the insurer to come forward with an explanation, or
to pay under his contract.
Richard B. Wilkins, Jr.
TINS Pb-3 (re-numbered March 1956).
24. See Erskine v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 76 D. & C. 172 (Pa. Dist. Ct.
1951).
25. See Deckler v. Travelers Indem. Co,, 94 So. 2d 55 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1957).
26. See Opgenorth, Mysterious Disappearance and Presumption of Theft
Clause, 1952 Ins. L.J. 97, 98.
27. The court in Seward v. Assurance Co. of America, 32 Cal. Rptr. 821
(1963) takes this view explicitly.
28. The answer to the objection that all the insured need do is show that he
cannot prove anything is that the view taken does not in any way lessen the
insured's burden of showing affirmatively that his loss falls within the policy
coverage-loss by mysterious disappearance.
29. Midlo v. Indiana Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 160 So. 2d 314 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1964). Insured placed his wife's ring on his handkerchief in his pocket
prior to his wife's admission to a hospital. He went about his affairs for a day
or two, and when he went to remove the ring and the handkerchief they were
not where he had put them. The court concluded that the evidence established a
mysterious disappearance.
30. Id. at 316,
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